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Abstract
The U.S. hedge fund market is one of the largest and most sophisticated hedge fund markets in the world, yet due to U.S. securities
regulation it is also one of the least accessible. In the U.S., federal securities law requires individuals to be wealthy to qualify to
invest in hedge funds. Nonwealthy individuals, or retail investors,
are effectively prohibited from purchasing hedge fund securities.
Wealth-based qualifications are meant to ensure that those investing in hedge funds possess enough financial sophistication to make
informed investment decisions. However, the application of wealthbased qualifications to hedge fund investors is more an artifact of
the specific regulatory framework under which the funds operate
than a reflection of any fundamentally unique economic charac-

teristics of the funds. Hedge funds possess risk and disclosure
characteristics comparable to a wide range of investment opportunities that U.S. retail investors are currently permitted to invest
in and also typically make disclosures sufficient for retail investors
to make informed investment decisions. Limiting hedge funds only
to the wealthy prevents financially sophisticated yet nonwealthy
investors from using the funds to minimize losses and maximize
the risk-adjusted returns of their investment portfolios. To more
fully advance the regulatory goals of investor protection and capital
formation, U.S. financial regulators should therefore enact reforms
to permit retail investors to invest in hedge funds.
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U.S. law makes a clear distinction between wealthy investors (which
includes high net worth individuals and highly capitalized institutions) and ordinary individuals, who are often referred to as retail
investors. This distinction is manifested in a dichotomy in the U.S.
hedge fund market. On the one hand, the U.S. has the largest and
oldest hedge fund market in the world. Approximately half of the
world’s hedge funds assets are based in the U.S. alone, as are the
overwhelming majority of the largest funds which have over U.S.$1
billion in assets2. On the other hand, due to U.S. securities regulation, its hedge fund market is also far less accessible to the general
public than many other jurisdictions.
U.S. securities law requires investors to be wealthy to legally qualify
to invest in hedge funds. For individual investors, this means earning at least U.S.$200,000 in annual income if single (U.S.$300,000
in annual income if married) or having a net worth of at least U.S.$1

In addition, retail investors that have an interest in hedge funds likely
have, either alone or with the assistance of a financial adviser, enough
financial sophistication to make investment decisions that reduce the

million. U.S. law also prohibits hedge funds from making any communications with the public, even if they otherwise do not sell their
securities to retail investors. According to a 2007 U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) estimate, wealth-based qualifications permit only 8.5 percent of U.S. households to invest in hedge
funds3.

overall risk of their portfolios. Unsophisticated retail investors, by
contrast, would likely have no desire to invest in vehicles with which
they have little familiarity. In any case, the companies and products
unsophisticated retail investors are permitted to invest in are not
uniformly safer or less prone to fraud, easier to understand, or even
more meaningfully transparent than hedge funds.

In contrast to the U.S., several regulatory regimes governing welldeveloped financial markets permit retail investors to have far
greater access to hedge funds than their counterparts in the U.S.
In Australia, hedge funds that register with the government and
make basic disclosures are permitted to market and sell securities to retail investors without any restrictions on their investment activities4. Irish law recognizes a category of funds that may
invest in hedge funds and are accessible to retail investors without
restriction5. Spain and Switzerland have also established regulatory frameworks for retail investors to access hedge funds directly
or through funds of hedge funds, as have Japan and Singapore6.
Hong Kong permits retail investors to purchase the shares of
hedge funds and funds of hedge funds with investments as small
as U.S.$50,000 and U.S.$10,000, respectively7. The U.K.’s Financial
Services Authority is also currently considering regulatory reforms
to allow retail investors greater access to hedge funds. Under U.S.
law, however, selling shares to retail investors would prohibit a fund
from charging a performance-based fee and substantially restrict
the fund’s ability to utilize alternative investment strategies — two
of the defining features of hedge funds.

The SEC is mandated by law to advance investor protection.
Investor protection entails protecting investors from economic
losses stemming from fraud and more subtle forms of opportunism
by issuers, traders, and other market participants. However, a securities regime does not fully protect investors from losses merely by
promoting informed investment decision-making through mandatory disclosure and prohibiting fraud, manipulation, and other types
of malfeasance. Investor protection also requires that investors be
permitted to invest in a wide range of securities to diversify the
risks to their portfolios. Today, due to the explosive growth and
integration of global financial markets and rapid financial innovation, even a conservative portfolio of stocks and bonds cannot
escape losses stemming from fluctuations in the global capital markets. Investor protection policy must recognize the interconnectedness of the financial markets, since investment losses stemming
from investment risk are no less destructive to investor wealth than
losses stemming from malfeasance.

Wealth-based qualifications in the U.S. are meant to advance
investor protection. From the point of view of the SEC, limiting
the class of investors able to invest in hedge funds makes it likely
that those who invest in the funds possess a sufficient degree of
financial sophistication to make informed investment choices, are
able to hire the services of those with enough sophistication, or at

74

least have the ability to bear substantial investment risk. Although
wealth-based qualifications may prevent some unsophisticated
investors from making uninformed hedge fund investments, several
facts about the nature of modern financial markets suggest that
SEC policy toward hedge funds generally undermines the interests
of U.S. retail investors. Today, U.S. investors are able to invest in a
vast and growing array of investments, such as mutual funds that
employ hedge fund-like strategies and synthetic exchange-traded
funds that track the performance of niche market sectors. These
investment products possess comparable risk and disclosure characteristics to hedge funds even though they are subject to the full
U.S. securities law regime.

2 Barth, J.R., and T. Li, 2006, “Hedge funds: risks and returns in global capital markets,” December, 13-14; HedgeFund Intelligence, 2008, “Global hedge fund assets rise
27% to $2.6 trillion,” April
3 Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007, Prohibition of fraud by advisers to certain pooled investment vehicles; accredited investors in certain private investment
vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 406 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 230 & 275)

Historically, hedge funds have been able to reduce and even
eliminate investor losses entirely during general market downturns.
Because hedge funds are uniquely able to diversify a portfolio from
market risks, the funds not only advance the same goal sought by
investor protection regulation, but do so in a way other investment
products cannot. Limiting hedge funds only to the wealthy prevents
financially sophisticated yet nonwealthy investors from using the
funds to minimize losses and maximize the risk-adjusted returns
of their investment portfolios. Such a limitation may deprive non4 Axiss Australia, 2006-07, “The hedge funds industry in Australia,” 13
5 Dillon Eustace Financial Service Group, 2004, “Hedge funds and alternative investment in Ireland,” 14-16.
6 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007, “Under the spotlight: the regulation, taxation, and
distribution of hedge funds around the globe,” June, 37-39; KPMG, 2008, “Japan:
regulation, hedge funds”; KPMG, 2008, “Singapore: regulation, hedge funds”.
7 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007, “Under the spotlight: the regulation, taxation, and
distribution of hedge funds around the globe,” June, 25
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wealthy investors from having the same opportunities as wealthy
investors to save their income and accumulate wealth over time.
Prohibiting hedge funds from selling shares to retail investors is
thus an artifact of the U.S. securities regime long rendered obsolete
by financial innovation and the maturation of the global investment
marketplace. This article proposes reforms to update U.S. law by
permitting retail investors to have greater access to hedge funds.

Hedge funds and the retail sector
‘Hedge fund’ is a label that applies to a very diverse group of
investment funds, not all of which technically hedge their investments. Although there is no definition of hedge fund under U.S.
securities law, a hedge fund is widely understood to be a type of
private investment pool not subject to the full range of restrictions
on investment activities and disclosure obligations imposed by the
federal securities laws. Hedge funds typically make very frequent
trades in securities and financial derivatives, although a significant
portion make relatively long-term investments and may do so in
investments other than financial instruments. Hedge funds charge
a performance-based fee to investors in addition to a fee based
upon assets under management. What distinguishes hedge funds
from other types of private investment funds is that hedge funds
calculate and allocate performance fees to managers on an annual
or quarterly basis, even if no investments have been traded (and
gains or losses realized).
Performance fees are typically structured with high-water marks,
which require that managers first recover any prior losses before
a performance allocation can be made. Hedge funds also limit the
ability of investors to withdraw capital to a periodic basis (i.e., only
at the end of the month or quarter), prohibit investors from transferring shares, and typically institute a lock-up which allows the
fund to hold initial capital contributions for a period ranging from
one quarter to two years. Hedge fund managers also often invest
a substantial portion of their own net worth into the funds they
advise, not only to benefit from investment gains, but also to align
their incentives with and signal quality to investors. In addition to
buying securities to be later sold at a higher price, hedge funds also
typically employ investment strategies comprised of trading derivatives, short selling, and using leverage.
As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close,
the hedge fund industry displays characteristics typical of a rapidly
maturing entrepreneurial sector of the economy. Rapid growth in
assets under management and number of funds is perhaps the
most noticeable trend in the industry. From 1999 to 2004, the
global hedge fund industry nearly doubled in size, growing from
an estimated U.S.$456 billion in assets under management to
U.S.$973 billion, with the number of funds also approximately dou8 Counterparty Risk Mgmt. Policy Group II, 2005, “Toward greater financial stability: a
private sector perspective, July 27, Appendix B-10.
9 HedgeFund.Net, 2008, “Hedge fund industry asset flow/performance report, first
quarter ending March 31, 2008”; HedgeWeek, 2008 “PerTrac study sees increase in
hedge fund reporting, but new launches slow,” June 3.

bling to 7,436 from 3,6178. By the end of the first quarter of 2008,
the hedge fund industry was comprised of approximately U.S.$2.8
trillion in assets managed across an estimated 15,250 separate
single-manager funds9.
Along with the rapid influx of managers and funds has come a
decrease in superior risk-adjusted returns, or alpha, reflecting the
inherent scarcity of arbitrage opportunities and the widespread
diffusion of hedge fund investment strategies. Financial institutions
are also playing an increasingly significant, if not wholly dominant,
role in the industry. Earlier years were characterized by standalone (or boutique) investment funds providing services to high net
worth individuals. Today, large investment banks such as Goldman
Sachs and J.P. Morgan routinely sponsor and manage hedge funds,
and provide prime brokerage services to a significant share of the
industry. Large institutional investors are also increasingly becoming the funds’ dominant investor base. Along with institutionalization is increasing sophistication, as hedge funds and their specialized third-party service providers continue to adopt increasingly
standardized operating procedures, employ more sophisticated
controls, and increase resources committed to risk personnel, operations, and external monitoring10. Nonetheless, hedge funds, like
other financial institutions, still face significant challenges such as
valuing illiquid assets and mitigating the operational risks of overthe-counter derivatives trading.
Outside of the U.S., a niche market is growing within the hedge
fund sector to provide services to retail investors. In Australia, for
example, high net worth and retail investors together account for
approximately two-thirds of the hedge fund market investor base11.
Other jurisdictions that permit retail access to hedge funds are likely
to see greater participation as demand for alternative investment
products by retail investors seems to be growing. Nonetheless, even
in the absence of regulation, not all hedge funds would seek retail
investor clientele. In some non-U.S. jurisdictions, retail investment
funds that invest in hedge funds have emerged as the most commercially feasible structure for retail investors to have access to
hedge funds.

The U.S. hedge fund legal regime
U.S. hedge funds are primarily governed by the business entity law
of the state or off-shore jurisdiction in which they are organized,
the law of contract as is applicable to their internal operating
agreement and relationships with investors and counterparties,
and federal securities law which is promulgated and enforced at
the national level. U.S.-based hedge funds are typically organized
as limited partnerships or limited liability companies. This structure
minimizes the tax liability of the manager and the fund and gives
the manager wide-ranging flexibility in managing the fund’s internal
affairs and carrying out its investment strategy.
10 Mercer Oliver Wyman, 2006, “New study reveals strengthened global hedge fund
industry risk management practices and highlights areas for improvement,” June 20.
11 Axiss Australia, supra note 4, at 8
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Federal law applicable to issuers and investment funds creates a
two-tiered structure within which retail investors have virtually
no access to hedge funds. U.S. securities laws and regulations do
not directly limit investors in their ability to invest in hedge funds.
However, hedge funds typically find it essential to their business
model to operate without being subject to the full scope of federal
regulation that would restrict their investment strategies, impose
costly mandatory disclosure requirements, and prohibit their ability
to charge a performance fee. To qualify for exemptions from certain federal laws, investment funds must limit their investor base to
wealthy individuals and institutions. Accordingly, the choices hedge
funds make in response to regulation keep retail investors out of
the market.
Four major federal securities laws are applicable to investment
funds, and an archetypal hedge fund operates to gain partial exemption from at least three of them by, among other things, not selling
its securities to retail investors. The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) governs the conduct of companies raising capital in the U.S.
capital markets12. It requires issuers of securities to register with the
SEC and file a registration statement containing information such as
a description of the issuer’s business and the risks associated with
purchasing its securities. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) mandates registration and periodic disclosure from
issuers (i.e., annual and quarterly reports) whose securities trade in
a secondary market on a national exchange13.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act)
applies to issuers in the business of investing or trading securities.
The Investment Company Act imposes extensive and detailed disclosure requirements on registered investment companies, requires
a board comprised of at least 40 percent independent directors,
and limits investment companies’ ability to utilize leverage, short
sales, and derivatives. Hedge fund investment strategies are often
centered around the efficient utilization of such techniques. Finally,
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) requires that
registered investment fund managers disclose information about
their general investment strategy, potential conflicts of interest,
personnel background, and any financial or legal issue that may
prevent the adviser from meeting its contractual commitments to
clients. The Advisers Act also generally prohibits registered investment advisers from charging a performance fee to clients.
Hedge funds are exempt from the registration and disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act because they do not offer their
securities to the public. Rather, hedge funds must make a private
placement of securities to select financially sophisticated investors without using any form of widespread advertising or solicitation, and must take steps to prevent resales of their securities. To
ensure that the securities offering falls within the scope of a private
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12
13
14
15

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn.
Securities Act, Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5)-(6).
Company Act § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000); Company Act § 3(c)(7), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000); Company Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i)
(2000).
16 Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).

placement, hedge funds typically limit their securities to accredited
investors, which, in the case of individual investors, are defined by
law to include only large institutions and individuals earning at least
U.S.$200,000 in annual income if single (U.S.$300,000 in joint
income if married) or having a net worth of at least U.S.$1 million14.
Hedge funds gain exemption from the reporting requirements of
the Exchange Act in part by limiting the number of investors in each
fund to less than 500 persons.
To be exempt from the Investment Company Act, hedge funds can
either limit the number of investors in the fund to one hundred, or
only allow investors meeting the definition of a qualified purchaser to
invest in the fund, which in the case of individuals means the investor
must own at least U.S.$5 million in investments15. Finally, hedge fund
managers seeking exemption from the Advisers Act must qualify as
a private adviser, meaning that the manager does not advise more
than 15 funds, does not hold itself out to the public, and does not
advise a registered investment company16. Despite the general prohibition, a registered adviser may nonetheless charge a performance
fee if providing services to a fund excluded from the definition of
investment company because each investor is a qualified purchaser,
or if all investors in the fund meet the definition of qualified client,
which includes individuals having at least U.S.$1.5 million in net worth
or at least U.S.$750,000 managed by the adviser17.
Despite being exempt from substantial portions of the federal
securities law, hedge funds are still subject to pervasive federal
regulation. Hedge funds are subject to the antifraud provisions of
the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Even unregistered investment
advisers are prohibited from making false or misleading statements
regarding their investment strategies, experience, credentials,
risks associated with the fund, and valuation of the fund’s assets18.
In addition, hedge funds must disclose significant positions in
public company stock. For example, to prevent insider trading the
Exchange Act requires hedge funds to make a disclosure when
owning 10 or more percent of a company’s publicly traded equity
securities. To increase information about the investment activities
of institutional shareholders, the Exchange Act also requires hedge
funds to make a quarterly disclosure of all of their equity holdings
if the fund owns more than U.S.$100 million in stock traded on a
national exchange or on the NASDAQ19. In addition, hedge funds
that actively trade certain derivatives may be subject to regulation
by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, and those managing certain types of pension fund assets may be subject to the
strictures of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

The rationale for wealth-based qualifications
Qualification for the foregoing exemptions depend in large part on a
hedge fund selling securities only to wealthy investors who, in case
of individuals, must at a minimum meet the definition of an accred17 Advisers Act § 205(b)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(4); Advisers Act Rule 205-3(d)(1), 17
C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1).
18 Securities and Exchange Commission, Prohibition of fraud by advisers to certain
pooled investment vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44756, 44759 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
19 Exchange Act § 16(a)(3)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1; 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2007);
Exchange Act Rule 13f-1(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(b) (2007).

An artifact of law: U.S. prohibition of retail hedge funds

ited investor under the Securities Act. The rationale behind limiting
hedge funds to wealthy investors stems from a fundamental purpose
of U.S. securities law, which is to protect investors from being taken
advantage of by unscrupulous issuers of securities. These exemptions are based on the premise that being wealthy is an indicator of
financial sophistication or otherwise having the ability to bear the
type of risks associated with hedge funds. In 2007, the SEC proposed
to increase the wealth required to invest in private investment funds
to U.S.$2.5 million in investable assets. The SEC explained that substantial wealth hurdles to invest in hedge funds provide an objective
and clear standard to use in ascertaining whether a purchaser of
a private investment vehicle’s securities is likely to have sufficient
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to
enable them to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective investment, or to hire someone who can20.
The SEC thus considers wealthy investors able to make informed
choices about hedge funds because even if they do not possess
sufficient financial acumen they are able to purchase the services
of persons with financial sophistication, or at least bear losses from
poor investment choices. This approach, however, fails to take into
account the nature of the modern investment marketplace and the
disclosures typically made by hedge funds.

Investment opportunities available to U.S. retail
investors
Today, U.S. retail investors can invest in far more than stocks,
bonds, real estate, money-market instruments, and other traditional investments. Discount online brokerages allow retail investors to
engage in their own trading strategies involving options, futures,
and short sales with relatively little upfront capital and without the
need to consult a specialized broker. E*Trade Financial, one of the
most widely-utilized discount brokerages by American investors,
also enables investors through its foreign affiliates to invest in the
stock of foreign companies listed on the London Stock Exchange,
the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange, and Euronext Paris21. This includes the shares
of publicly listed hedge funds and funds of hedge funds on foreign
exchanges.

sectors such as global healthcare providers, Brazilian stocks, and
the bonds issued by emerging market governments.
Perhaps most importantly, innovations in financial products are
increasingly presenting U.S. retail investors with new hedge fundlike investments. One development is the growth of hedged mutual
funds, which are publicly registered investment companies that
mimic hedge fund strategies and only require an average minimum
investment of U.S.$5,000, with some as low as U.S.$50022. A popular type of hedged mutual fund is a 130/30 fund, which invests 30
percent of its net assets in short positions and uses the proceeds
to purchase an additional 30 percent long, thereby resulting in
130 percent long allocation and 30 percent short allocation23.
Other recent hedge fund-like retail investment products include
publicly listed hedge funds or alternative asset managers, such as
Fortress Investment Group, Och-Ziff Capital Management Group,
and Blackstone Group, all of which went public in the U.S. in 200724.
Additionally, there are synthetic hedge fund ‘clones’ or replicators,
which are index-based funds that attempt to replicate hedge fund
returns through complex, quantitative trading algorithms25. For
example, the Goldman Sachs Absolute Return Tracker Fund is open
to retail investors and seeks to replicate hedge fund market exposures based upon a proprietary Goldman Sachs hedge fund returns
index26. ETFs that mimic hedge funds and are accessible to retail
investors may also soon be available. For example, Stonebrook
Capital is planning to launch an ETF in 2009 that seeks to replicate
the returns of a global hedge funds index27.
All of these investment products are available without restriction to
U.S. retail investors. Yet, from the perspective of finance, they possess a level of investment risk, complexity, and transparency that is
comparable to that of hedge funds. For example, Proshares’ Ultra
ETFs and short ETFs achieve their stated investment objectives by
employing futures, options, swaps, forwards, and other complex
financial instruments. However, the ETFs are not required by law
to make specific disclosures about how these financial instruments
are specifically utilized, and instead make general disclosures about
their mathematical investment methodology, the definitions of such
instruments, and the numerous types of risk factors involved28.

In addition, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which are passively managed investment vehicles that track a basket of securities or a price
index, provide retail investors with complex investment opportunities in niche market sectors. For example, Proshares offers investors
effectively leveraged Ultra ETFs that double the daily performance
of general market indices and Short ETFs whose performance is the
opposite of a market index such as the Dow Jones Industrial Index
and the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. Several issuers offer ETFs
that track the value of commodities such as gold, silver, and oil,
while some other ETFs track the performance of non-U.S. market

Indeed, because hedge fund-like products pursue alternative investment strategies, they possess the very same risk characteristics
and complexities as genuine hedge funds29. Retail investors can also
use at-home trading platforms in conjunction with access to derivatives and short-sales to pursue any manner of investment strategy
on their own, including those employed by hedge funds. Moreover,
even investing in U.S. publicly traded companies is complicated
by the business operations of companies in a global and information-based economy. For example, the value of securities issued
by bulge-bracket banking and financial services conglomerates is

20 Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 3, at 405.
21 E*Trade Financial, Global Trading 2008
22 Agarwal, V., N. M. Boyson, and N. Y. Naik, 2007, “Hedge funds for retail investors? An
examination of hedged mutual funds,” June 4, 1; Shell, A., 2006, “Investors add a bit
of hedge fund to portfolio mix,” USA Today, Dec. 8, B1
23 Brewster, D., 2007, “The long/short show begins,” FT.com, Jan. 26
24 AFX News, 2007, “Och-Ziff Capital to follow Blackstone, Fortress IPOs,” Forbes.com,
Sept, 2

25 Hogan, M., 2006, “Hedge funds: attack of the clones,” BusinessWeek.com, Dec. 4;
Kat, H. and H. Palaro, 2005 “Hedge fund returns: you can make them yourself!” AIRC
Working Paper No. 0023
26 Trincal E., 2008, “Goldman clones HFs for the masses,” HedgeWorld, June 17
27 Benjamin, J., 2007, “Hedge funds face potential challenge,” InvestmentNews.
28 Proshares Prospectus, 2007, October 1, 6-11
29 Kat and Palaro (2005), Agarwal et al. (2007), Shell (2006)
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a function of their multiple business divisions and a wide-variety
of risks and developments including inflation, foreign exchange
fluctuations, patent acquisitions, the companies’ utilization of
derivatives and special purpose entities, and legal, accounting, and
regulatory developments.

spread throughout the industry, at least some funds are likely to
improve their disclosure practices to distinguish themselves from
competitors. Indeed, a survey of alternative asset managers found
that hedge funds make more frequent disclosures to investors than
private equity, real estate, and all other types of surveyed funds32.

While the disclosures made by complex operating companies, ETFs,
and hedge fund-like products provide useful information to investors, any system of mandatory disclosure is inherently limited in
its ability to provide retail investors with easily understandable
information about the complex factors upon which the value of
such companies’ shares truly depend. No system of disclosure can
prevent retail investors from having to confront substantial, if not
overwhelming, complexity in making investment decisions.

Information disclosed by hedge funds and other parties is therefore
sufficient for U.S. retail investors to make informed investment
decisions, at least when compared to the multitudes of other investment opportunities available to them. While not all retail investors
posses the requisite financial acumen to make informed investment choices about hedge funds or other opportunities currently
available to them, those that take the steps necessary to invest in
the funds will likely possess the requisite financial sophistication or
hire a third party to assist them in decision making. Unsophisticated
retail investors are highly unlikely to invest in hedge funds.

Hedge fund disclosures
While investment products open to U.S. retail investors have comparable, if not the exact same, risks and complexities to hedge
funds, they share much of the disclosure practices of SEC-registered issuers. Hedge funds make substantial and comprehensive
disclosures to comply with the laws they are subject to, comport
with industry norms, and satisfy investors. The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws serve as a form of implied
disclosure rule. Because these laws prohibit omissions and
misleading statements (in addition to false statements), when a
fund makes any disclosures it must make additional disclosures
to ensure no statements are later deemed misleading by a court
of law or enforcement authorities30. In addition, although hedge
funds are not required to make all of the same disclosures that are
necessary for an SEC registration statement, to gain exemption
under the Securities Act the funds must nonetheless disclose the
same general type of information.
Accordingly, in practice, hedge funds typically give potential investors a private placement memorandum which describes the fund,
its investment objectives, risk factors, its governance structure, and
how profits and fees are calculated. Hedge fund disclosures may
even be more extensive and investor-friendly than those made by
mutual funds, and are certainly far more extensive than the small,
closely held companies trading on the Pink OTC Markets, which are
available to U.S. retail investors but are not required to make periodic or audited financial statements31.
In response to the demands of institutional investors, hedge funds
are increasingly disclosing information about their investment
strategies and operational and risk-management practices. Third
parties such as Morningstar are also providing transparency by
making information about hedge funds widely accessible and rating their performance. In addition, to the extent the hedge fund
market becomes more crowded and returns become more evenly
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30 First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977)
31 Securities and Exchange Commission, Pink Sheets, May 30, 2008
32 PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2008, “Transparency versus returns: the institutional
investor view of alternative assets,” March

Research finds that retail investors are typically risk averse, fail to
properly diversify their portfolios, and are biased towards investing
in companies they are familiar with, even when doing so undermines their economic interests33.
Increased access to hedge funds is thus highly unlikely to induce
unsophisticated retail investors to invest in funds they know little
about given that they currently fail to utilize the vast array of
widely publicized and low-cost opportunities (i.e., mutual funds,
ETFs) already open to them. Retail hedge funds operated by major
financial institutions have little incentive to market or sell their
shares with promises of exorbitant returns merely to appeal to
uninformed investors. Indeed, one result of the credit crisis that
began in 2007 is that hedge fund managers will likely make more
conservative performance predictions to investors, as even optimistic communications about the general state of the economy may
now be grounds for fraud liability.

The benefits of investing in hedge funds for retail
investors
The basic lesson of modern portfolio economics is that diversifying
the risks to which one is exposed will help to maximize an investor’s
risk-adjusted returns. Hedge funds tend to be exposed to risks different than those to which traditional investments are exposed,
including the risks associated with exposure to overall market fluctuations. This means that investing in hedge funds has the potential
to help diversify a portfolio and make retail investors better off.
Compared to equity returns, hedge funds’ relatively low correlation with fluctuations in the overall market means that the funds
can produce absolute returns — gains even while equity returns are
negative. From 1994 to 2007, the CSFB hedge fund index indicates
that hedge fund returns closely tracked those of the S&P 500
equity index, but did so with far less volatility and correlation with
overall market fluctuations34.
33 Cao, H. H., B. Han, H. H. Zhang, and D. A. Hirshleifer, 2007, “Fear of the unknown: the
effects of familiarity on financial decisions,”; Bailey, W., A. Kumar, and D. Ng, 2006,
“Home bias of U.S. individual investors: causes and consequences,” Working Paper,
Cornell University
34 Jorion, P., “How portfolio transparency can help manage hedge fund risk,” J.
Financial Transformation 22, 68.
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Hedge funds’ relatively low correlation with the overall market has
thus far remained in tact during the subprime mortgage-initiated
credit crisis that began in 2007. Losses from sub-prime-backed
securities began to spread to the financial markets generally after
the U.S. securities firm Bear Stearns announced on June 22, 2007
that it had bailed out two of its own hedge funds due to losses from
investments in such securities. During what may be considered
approximately the first year of the credit crunch, from June 1, 2007
through May 30, 2008, the U.S. stock market lost 8.27 percent of
its value while hedge funds globally produced gains estimated from
1.83 percent to 4.97 percent, depending on which hedge fund dataset is used and whether a composite index or a diversified funds of
hedge funds strategy is considered to be the more truly representative measure of the funds’ returns35.

the SEC attempted to increase the minimum net worth required to
invest in hedge funds to U.S.$2.5 million through a rulemaking procedure that was, ultimately, never finalized41. Nonetheless, voices
at the SEC have at times expressed a desire to increase hedge
fund access to retail investors. For example, in testimony on May
22, 2003 before the House Committee on Financial Services, then
Chairman William H. Donaldson noted that “there is a definite need
to examine how hedge funds, properly run and properly disclosed,
can be allowed to be purchased by retail investors.” Based upon
the examination in this article, there are several types of regulatory
reforms that would enable retail investors to have access to and
benefit from hedge funds.

However, directly comparing hedge fund return figures with those

The most straightforward approach would be to permit U.S. investors to have direct access to hedge funds. This would entail substantially reducing or eliminating the wealth-based qualifications

of equities obscures some important differences between them.
Hedge funds, for example, may not allow investors to withdraw
their capital when desired whereas stock investments can be exited
daily in the secondary markets. Furthermore, hedge funds have risk
properties that may cause individual funds to have more extreme
negative returns than stock or bond investments36. Nonetheless,
the overall performance of hedge funds since 1994, and especially
during the bursting of the Internet bubble and the credit crisis
thus far, strongly suggests that retail investors could benefit from
allocating some portion of their portfolio to these funds. Indeed,
numerous academic studies find that hedge funds can improve the
performance of a more traditional stock and bond portfolio37.

required for funds to participate in various securities-related activities. In particular, it would entail substantially reducing the amount
of wealth required to meet the definition of accredited investor
under the Securities Act so that retail investors could purchase the
securities of hedge funds in a private offering. Similarly, it would
require substantially reducing the amount of wealth required to
meet the definition of qualified purchaser under the Investment
Company Act so that retail investors could invest in a private fund.
Finally, it would also entail substantially reducing the amount of
wealth required to meet the definition of a qualified client under the
Advisers Act so that registered advisers could charge performance
fees to a fund with retail clientele.

In addition, hedge fund-like investments currently available to retail
investors have yet to provide a true alternative to genuine hedge
funds. Since going public in 2007, the share prices of U.S. publicly
listed alternative asset managers have all produced losses (despite
the profitability of their underlying funds). Furthermore, while
hedge fund clones may be able to outperform some hedge funds,
thus far they have been unable to outperform hedge funds generally38. And while hedged mutual funds may outperform traditional
mutual funds, they have generally been unable to match the performance of hedge funds39. For instance, in the same twelve months
leading up to May 2008 analyzed above, a report by EurekaHedge
found that long/short equity hedge funds gained 5.62 percent while
130/30 hedged mutual funds lost 2.26 percent40.

In addition, to enable retail hedge funds to be sufficiently capitalized through raising relatively smaller allocations of funds from
retail investors, the 500-investor limitation for companies to be
exempt from the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act
would also have to be removed or at least dramatically increased.
Following the policy of other jurisdictions, the SEC could also enact
a compromise reform by removing the wealth-based qualifications
for investors in hedge funds that are managed by a governmentregistered investment adviser.

U.S. financial regulators generally support the policy of imposing
wealth-based qualifications to invest in hedge funds. Indeed, in 2007

Another general approach is to allow retail investors greater
access to hedge fund investment strategies through a registered
investment company. This approach was suggested in a 2003 SEC
staff report which concluded that retail investors may benefit if
registered investment companies were less restricted by regulation from pursuing hedge fund-like investment strategies42. There
are two basic types of public investment companies. The first is an

35 The cumulative returns from June 2007 to May 2008, based upon the monthly
returns, were 1.83% for the EDHEC Funds of Funds index and 4.97% for the Credit
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index.
36 Brooks, C., and H. Kat, 2002, “The statistical properties of hedge fund index returns
and their implications for investors,” Journal of Alternative Investments, Fall, 26-44
37 Bacmann, J., and G. Gawron, 2005, “Fat-tail risk in portfolio of hedge funds and traditional investment,” in Gregoriou, G. N., N. Papageorgiou, G. Hubner, and F. D. Rouah
(eds) Hedge funds: insights in performance measurement, risk analysis and portfolio
allocation,” John Wiley & Sons Inc.; Cremers, J., M. Kritzman, and S. Page, 2005,
“Optimal hedge fund allocations: do higher moments matter?” Journal of Portfolio
Management, 29:4, 11–23

38 Hasanhodzic, J., and A. Lo, 2007 “Can hedge-fund returns be replicated?: The linear
case,” Journal of Investment Management, 5, 19–20; Hogan (2006); Benjamin, J.,
2008, “Offering a virtual hedge fund,” InvestmentNews, June 9
39 Agarwal et al. (2007)
40 Eurekahedge, 2008, “Absolute return: a comparative review of recent hedge fund
performance,”
41 Securities and Exchange Commission (2007). The proposed rulemaking was not finalized likely in part due to the numerous vociferous complaints the SEC received from
the public during the comment period.
42 Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003, “Implications of the growth of hedge
funds,” 104
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open-end investment company that sells daily-redeemable shares
to investors that do not trade on secondary markets. These companies are often referred to as mutual funds and, in the U.S., comprise
over 95 percent of the assets involved with registered investment
companies. Another type of registered investment company is a
closed-end fund. Closed-end funds offer a fixed number of shares
that, unlike mutual funds, trade in secondary markets and are only
redeemable at specified time periods.
However, the Investment Company Act limits all registered investment companies from pursuing the full range of investment strategies utilized by hedge funds involving leverage, short sales, and
derivatives trading. To use leverage in the form of borrowing bank
funds, a registered investment company must cover the debt by
retaining assets equivalent to at least 300 percent of the borrowings43. Registered investment companies must also offset any short
position and certain derivatives positions by a corresponding long
position or by holding liquid securities of an equivalent value in
a segregated account.44 Mutual funds in particular are prohibited
from employing lock-ups or other investor liquidity-constraining
devices. In addition, mutual funds typically adopt relatively narrow
long-only investment strategies and lack the flexibility to quickly
adapt to changing market conditions because deviating from
an investment policy deemed fundamental requires shareholder
approval. Each of these limitations on investment companies’
activities would need to be substantially reduced or eliminated to
permit them to offer investors the full range of benefits associated
with hedge fund investing.
A third approach to increasing retail investors’ access to hedge
funds would be to enact reforms that would afford retail investors
the opportunity to invest in a public investment company that in
turn invests in underlying hedge funds. In jurisdictions where retail
investors have access to hedge funds, it is often through investing in such funds of hedge funds. Besides offering investors the
benefits of professional management and diversification of hedge
fund investments, funds of hedge funds may also be more attractive from the perspective of hedge fund providers. Hedge funds
often find that the optimal investment contributions required, from
the perspective of managing a fund, are typically larger than retail
investors are able to afford, and would therefore not seek out retail
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43 Company Act § 18(c) (closed-end investment companies), § 18(f) (open-end investment companies).
44 Emerald Management Co., 1978, SEC no-action letter, Jan 21; Lederman, S., 2007,
Hedge fund regulation, § 5:2.7, 5-28-29.

investors even if no regulatory consequences were present. A fund
of hedge funds can overcome this limitation by pooling together
smaller contributions from retail investors.
However, because the Investment Company Act prohibits mutual
funds from investing greater than 15 percent of the net value of
their assets in illiquid securities, which includes those typically
issued by hedge funds45, removing this limitation would be required
for mutual funds to become the appropriate vehicle for a retail fund
of hedge funds. A closed-end fund, on the other hand, has no limitations regarding holding illiquid assets and may therefore be the
more appropriate vehicle for establishing a fund of hedge funds for
retail investors. Unlike a mutual fund, however, a closed-end fund
of hedge funds would likely limit investors’ ability to redeem shares
as do genuine hedge funds.

Conclusion
Although the U.S. securities law and enforcement regime is rightly
considered among the highest quality in the world, SEC regulation
of hedge funds is increasingly falling behind that of other jurisdictions with respect to retail investor access. Wealth-based
qualifications do not protect retail investors from bearing the
risks associated with hedge funds and do not prevent retail investors from investing in a wide range of investments that may be
too complicated for their level of financial sophistication. Rather,
wealth-based qualifications deprive retail investors of access to the
full range of investment products and talents of financial market
practitioners and likely have the effect of increasing the risk of
retail investors’ portfolios.
Although several non-U.S. jurisdictions have embraced the inevitability of an ever-widening and complex array of investment products
entering the marketplace, U.S. national regulators have yet to update
the U.S. regulatory framework to permit retail investors to invest in
hedge funds alongside numerous other comparable investment products. Although investor protection concerns may explain the reluctance of the SEC to ease access to hedge funds, the funds’ historical
performance relative to that of regulated investment companies and
other regulated issuers suggests that failing to permit greater access
actually undermines investors’ economic welfare — the very goal that
investor protection regulation seeks to advance.

45 Investment Company Act Rel. No. 18,612. The SEC defines “illiquid” securities as those
that cannot be sold at near their net asset value within seven days. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2003, “Implications of the growth of hedge funds,” 105 n.333.

